The Russian Media Wars
What we can Learn From a Ukrainian Media Theorist About How Russian Propaganda Works
Every day Russian propagandist media produces new misinformation, like a factory working ceaselessly on the constitution of a parallel world. Nevertheless, many people still ask themselves: is Russia not entitled to have its own opinion, its own perspective on events? The aim of this article is to explain how the actors behind Russian propaganda exploit precisely this naive belief in order to drive home their own aggressive political agenda. The basic strategies of the Russian information war will be explained in this article by reference to the expression ‘media crisis’, as it was coined by Ukrainian media theorist Georgy Pocheptsov in 2003.
Media as weapon
The actors of Russian propaganda are famous for their criticism of the credibility of the Western press. They often point to the one-sidedness with which events in war zones are portrayed, and to the prejudice of journalists on both sides. In doing so they use every opportunity to trivialize the concept of freedom of opinion or even to turn it into its opposite.1 However, what is presented as criticism of ‘informed society’ is actually only an attempt to justify an aggressive political agenda.
This agenda is aggressive not only because Russia’s military interventions go hand in hand with propaganda, but also because this propaganda conveys a world view in which ‘truth’ apparently no longer exists.2 This world view also shapes a perception of the media that sees journalistic work as being essentially a medium for media warfare and for controlling opinion, and not as a platform for social dialogue or cultural self-reflection.3
In 2012, Margarita Simonyan, Director of the channel RT (formerly Russia Today) referred to the ‘information war’ that was gaining strength globally, only to link this to the need for a ‘Russian weapon’ (namely RT) in her next breath.4 According to Anton Shekhovtsov, this peculiar self-legitimation confirms the channel’s military agenda.5 Although the state-sponsored television channel RT was initially only launched as a counterpart to the UK and US channels with global reach like the BBC or CNN – as an instrument of so-called ‘soft power’ – the news that it carries has become steadily more aggressive and anti-Western since about 2008.6
In the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, this aggressive agenda has reached a new peak. Many international journalists noted with concern the increasingly blurred boundaries of their professional field, as they were faced with the task of having to counter obviously false reports and lies by the Russian side with field research and documentation work (fact-checking), for example, when the bomb-ravaged hospital in Mariupol or the devastation of Bucha were declared by the Russian propagandists to have been ‘staged’.7
In the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, this aggressive agenda has reached a new peak. Many international journalists noted with concern the increasingly blurred boundaries of their professional field, as they were faced with the task of having to counter obviously false reports and lies by the Russian side with field research and documentation work (fact-checking), for example, when the bomb-ravaged hospital in Mariupol or the devastation of Bucha were declared by the Russian propagandists to have been ‘staged’.7
The counterfactual statements of the Russian propagandists often have an irritating effect, since they make the recipients doubt the existence of an objective understanding of reality and truth.8 In the field of communication they operate with the most banal means of exerting influence, as described in detail by the Ukrainian media theorist Georgy Pocheptsov in his book Information Policy Technologies in 2003. A good twenty years after the book was published, the model of the media crisis itself is being used by Russian propaganda as manipulation against Ukraine.
Georgy Pocheptsov between Ukraine and Russia
Georgy Pocheptsov (born in 1949) is a Ukrainian media theorist and author of more than 65 books including 40 theoretical works on media science and information technologies, the functioning of propaganda and opinion manipulation as well as science fiction novels for children and young adults. He is Professor Emeritus at the University of Mariupol and former head of the Department for Communication and Public Relations at the Institute for International Relations of the Taras Shevchenko University in Kyiv (Ukraine). His only written work that has been translated into German is a chapter from his book Informacionno-političeskie technologii [En.: Information Policy Technologies] from 2003, that was included by Ulrich Schmid in his anthology “Russian Media Theories”, published in 2005.
To categorize Pocheptsov as a Russian media theorist appears rather questionable in light of recent political events. And yet this work, like many other works by Pocheptsov, was actually written in Russian and published in Moscow (by the publisher Centr). Information Policy Technologies can therefore be understood as an introduction to this topic for a Russian-speaking readership that tends to be inexperienced in this field. In it, Pocheptsov builds on well-known works from Western research into propaganda and opinion management in democratic systems9 and attempts to organize their findings and apply them to the post-Soviet situation in general. Pocheptsov’s perspective on the media proves particularly insightful when analyzing the Russian propaganda apparatus.
Russian media, post-Soviet media, Western media: what is the difference?
In the context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the resulting pluralization of media, Pocheptsov undertakes a critical analysis of his own information environment, which is undergoing an acute process of transformation, and reveals its weaknesses in comparison with the Western model.
According to Pocheptsov, there are three independent stakeholders facing government in the West: a strong political opposition, a good-quality and professional press and an active population. In contrast to this, the post-Soviet media landscape is characterized by a stronger contrast between the media and the much more powerful government, while the opposition and the population tend to be described as weak or inactive. In such a situation the media assume both the function of the political opposition and the function of the civilian population – as long as they operate independently. However, since the media are reliant on massive financial resources, for which they depend either on the State or on other powerful sponsors, Pocheptsov sees the task of professional journalism to “guide” society as being significantly limited in the post-Soviet situation.
Pocheptsov does see some positive examples of this type of journalistic work being carried out by the television channel NTV in Moscow, which for a time acted as the mouthpiece of society. Pocheptsov, Georgy: Informationspolitische Technologien [2003], in: Schmid, Ulrich (pub.): Russische Medientheorien. (= Facetten der Medienkultur), Bern 2005, s. 236.,
Pocheptsov does see some positive examples of this type of journalistic work being carried out by the television channel NTV in Moscow, which for a time acted as the mouthpiece of society. Pocheptsov, Georgy: Informationspolitische Technologien [2003], in: Schmid, Ulrich (pub.): Russische Medientheorien. (= Facetten der Medienkultur), Bern 2005, s. 236.,
The broadcaster’s positive reputation was based among other things on its critical reporting on the first Chechen war, during the course of which it would “regularly report on serious human rights violations by Russian troops in Chechnya”.10 For a short time following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NTV was considered to be “a contributor to opinion in politics and society”11 as well as a model for independent television12, since it maintained high professional standards and provided critical analyses.13
However, following the hostile takeover of the channel by the media group Gazprom in 2001, it took a more conformist approach.14 From that point onwards, critical or ironic statements about the government were no longer allowed.
Nevertheless, until 2022 there continued to be a division between media channels that conformed to the system (Pervyj Kanal, Rossija-1 and NTV) and financially and politically independent media (such as Echo Moskvy, Dožd and Meduza). And yet, following the adoption of a new law on war reporting,15 the majority of this latter group had to either completely cease their work in Russia or relocate their headquarters abroad.16
According to Pocheptsov, the breakdown of the social role of the media in a post-Soviet landscape follows a distinct pattern. The less a society is aware of its common goals and priorities, the more the press has to focus on creating content that would appeal to that society as a ‘mass’ of people. However, when the media ostensibly functions only as a ‘medium of mass communication’, then it will be particularly susceptible to misuse as an arena for scandalization and conflict. It is in this context that Pocheptsov introduces his model of ‘media crises’.
Controlling the masses
Contrary to the notion of a ‘media crisis’ that is common today, that is, a crisis of the media that is bound up with a loss of credibility and trust in the public media and expert opinion, Pocheptsov (2003) understands the term media crisis to be more of an abstract model to explain the fundamental functioning of a space where information is shared or disseminated. This model, he believes, can be recognized in the Western as well as the post-Soviet system: “in a media crisis there are always two information systems that collide. A fierce battle is fought over which interpretation of events is the single right one. This means that two opposing interpretations of one event/object collide.”17
A media crisis occurs when there are two conflicting interpretations of one and the same event in a particular area of the media. Although Pocheptsov points out that media crises can occur in an unplanned and uncontrolled manner, that is, as ‘natural’ phenomena in the media, he sees them primarily as a means of exerting political influence. Pocheptsov’s definition of a media crisis therefore presupposes that communication by the media is not an exchange of information but rather an information battle: the proclamation of a particular world view and the dissemination of this world view to the largest possible audience.
In connection with this, Pocheptsov’s scientific interest is primarily focused on the interests of the political centre and the dangers to which it can be exposed. Consequently, his reasoning is based on examples in which the media represent a means of applying political pressure (extortion) on the centre of power: for example, when a document leaked to the press proves that a politician is corrupt and leads to their having to resign from their leadership position.18
Pocheptsov speaks persistently of the necessity of ‘dominating’ an ‘information space’ and ‘fighting out’ media crises, from the battle between interpretations of one and the same event, from the violent seizure of virtual (information) spaces [zachvat virtual’nych territorij] and of the information battle [Informacionnaja bor’ba]. Either the government consolidates media and power on their side, or else the opposition takes control of the masses with the help of the media and overthrows the government. Unfortunately, in his deliberations Pocheptsov completely excludes the possibility that the media can also have a controlling function vis-a-vis the State, the legislature and the law-making powers.
It is just such a militarizing perspective on the media that plays into the hands of propagandists who consider the instrumentalization of the media for government purposes as being justified and even inevitable. It is therefore hardly surprising that the strategies for winning media crises that Pocheptsov describes in such detail have been absorbed in the practices of Russian propaganda a good 20 years following their publication, as will be shown by means of examples below.
Who are the winners in a media war?
Pocheptsov distinguishes only two basic types of actors in a media crisis: the aggressive “street” spokesperson and the more restrained “parliamentary” spokesperson, both of which he describes as „leaders“ [lider].19 The first is the active originator of the media crisis, since he can act quickly and flexibly and remain close to his audience, thus being in a position to lead a popular movement. The second type of spokesperson, meanwhile, can only take on a passive role, since he can only act slowly and from “within the system”, relying only on “standardized procedures”.20
It goes without saying that the ‘leader of the streets’ will have the advantage in any media crisis and therefore always represent a potential threat to the centre of power. Minimizing the potential for the opposition media to play this role was therefore part of the strategies and techniques of Russian propaganda early on, ensuring that they could put themselves in the role of ‘leader of the masses’ abroad.
The best example of this is the foundation of the RT channel in 2005, which originally set itself the goal (or so it was publicly proclaimed) of presenting the ‘Russian’21 perspective on the world’s news and thus creating a counterpoint to the Western public service media, which were pejoratively described as ‘mainstream’. “Question more” was therefore appropriately chosen as a slogan for RT, since it highlighted its questioning stance with respect to the ‘one-sidedness’ and ‘manipulation’ of the media.22
In their endeavor to draw attention to something that had previously been ‘overlooked’ or ‘concealed’, or simply to present an ‘alternative’23 opinion, the broadcaster adopted the position of the ‘leader’ of the streets. In the early years of its transmission, the broadcaster was able to gain a broad audience and popularity by seeking an ‘alternative’ opinion on virtually every issue. For example, RT conducted interviews with the founder of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, the anti-capitalist, left-wing philosopher Slavoj Zizek, and was even nominated for an Emmy for its reporting on the Occupy movement in the US in its protests against the dealings of the big banks. All of this ensured a positive reputation for RT in the West and appeared to confirm its fundamentally ‘anti-hegemonic’ stance in the news. But when it came to the portrayal of the government in the Kremlin, any criticism of the leadership was suddenly forbidden.24
However, the most important means of exerting influence used by Russian propagandists targeting Western audiences is the practice of renaming, as will be demonstrated below by means of examples. According to Pocheptsov, the objective of renaming is to set a media crisis in motion and to create tension in an information space that can later be translated into (in the words of Pocheptsov, “discharged as”) a real confrontation. It is precisely the person who specifies the names of the actors involved who can retain control over a media crisis in the long term and later declare themselves the winner (or winners) of that crisis.25
The myth of a ‘fascist’ Ukraine
The failure by the then-Yanukovych government to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union in November 2013 served as the trigger for the
Euromaidan
Euromaidan
also:
Euromaidan refers to protests in Ukraine. After the government declared in November 2013 that it would not sign the association agreement with the EU as planned, mass protests took place on the central square Majdan Nesaleschnosti until February 2014.
Demonstrations in Kyiv (2013-4), also known as the ‘Maidan Uprising’. The demonstrations turned into mass protests from 1 December 2013, and were directed not least against the geopolitical involvement of Russia, which had by that point become closely involved in the internal political affairs of Ukraine.26 The increasing severity of police violence against the peaceful protesters (including students) was one of the reasons the demonstrations went on for so long and lead to an every greater sense of mistrust towards the pro-Russian government in Kyiv.Euromaidan movement
The general character of the resistance and the overall significance of these political events in the Ukraine was heavily distorted by state-controlled Russian television channels such as Pervyj Kanal or NTV. Instead of placing the demands of the masses for the resignation of the president, for democratic reform and for a generally more pro-European (instead of pro-Russian27) political orientation in the foreground of the media’s representation of the protests, Russian state media made Euromaidan into an armed coup d’état, apparently dominated by violent, right-wing extremist groups (in short, by Ukrainian terrorists and nationalists28).
A small proportion of the right-wing radicals in the Euromaidan, which, according to current estimates only made up a small fraction29 of the whole movement, was thus presented as an acute ‘neo-Nazi’ danger30 to the Russian-speaking part of the Ukrainian population.31
Such a targeted renaming of the parties involved by the Russian media had a specific objective according to the model described by Pocheptsov: it prepared the first stage in a media crisis that would legitimize a later transition from verbal to physical violence.
Such a targeted renaming of the parties involved by the Russian media had a specific objective according to the model described by Pocheptsov: it prepared the first stage in a media crisis that would legitimize a later transition from verbal to physical violence.
Thus, shortly after Euromaidan, on 16 March 2014, a controversial
referendum
referendum
The results of the referendum were not recognised internationally because the parliament of the Crimean Republic that had until then been autonomous but had belonged to Ukraine was occupied by armed soldiers. The parliament of the autonomous republic named the Russian nationalist Sergei Aksyonov as head of the Crimean government in February 2014, held a referendum on the status of Crimea in March and then immediately decided to join the Russian Federation.
took place on the Crimean Peninsula, by means of which the annexation of Crimea by Russian occupying forces, in violation of international law, was decided under circumstances that are not entirely clear.32 Two days after the referendum, on 18 March 2014, Vladimir Putin gave a solemn speech in the Kremlin in which he finally admitted that the annexation was the result of a Russian military intervention33 and that it was a ‘necessary’ measure that had been taken to save the Russian-speaking population in Crimea. These people had to be protected from the “wild hordes” of Ukrainian “terrorists” and “bandits” from Euromaidan.34
The soldiers that were subsequently sent from Russia to Crimea (known as “little green men” ) were originally meant to give the appearance of a movement that had grown out of Ukraine itself, but later, when it became known that this was just a deceptive maneuver, no attempt was made to keep their true provenance secret. In East Ukraine the conditions for a ‘hybrid war’ were actually only created by the media war: the groups now known as separatists were described by the state media in Russia as “volunteer fighters”, “people’s militia” or as “homeland defenders” in order to maintain the myth that the Ukrainian population was being controlled by radical right-wing ‘terrorists’ or even ‘fascists’.35
Russia’s media war against Ukraine thus did not suddenly change into a real war in 2022 – rather, the ‘information war’ that began in 2014 gradually extended Russia’s sphere of influence in East Ukraine and in so doing gradually opened up the possibility of an actual war of aggression.
Propaganda ‘from below’
A single instance of renaming is not enough to ensure long-term control over a media crisis and the maintenance of interpretive sovereignty. For this reason, the Russian perspective on events in Ukraine had to be repeated by as many agents of propaganda as possible, and above all, to be disseminated to Western audiences. Established media channels such as RT (formerly Russia Today) were engaged to this end together with apparently independent bloggers and amateur writers in the West.
Although it is not possible verify with any certainty whether one writer or another is spreading Russian propaganda of their own volition, or whether they belong to the numerous fake or simulated accounts of the infamous troll factory in Olgino (known as
“The Internet Research Agency”
“The Internet Research Agency”
After the first big protest-demonstrations in 2011/2012 in Russia, this institute was founded by the Russian government in order to bring public debate in social media under its long-term control. The task of the so-called ‚Internet trolls‘ (also known as cyber-soldiers), i.e. people who were paid to spend hours writing comments and posts under one or more fake accounts on different online platforms, was to make the attitude of the government look like the attitude of the population.
)36 , one can often categorize an online post as ‘propaganda’ simply by looking at the rhetoric employed or the key words that it contains. This was the case in the following example.
A Facebook user expressed her fears just a few days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine that the “Ukrainian military” was apparently attacking and shooting its own population. The fact that she was referring to police violence against the protesters at Euromaidan that actually took place, and casting it in a false light, should be ignored for the time being. The post ends with the words “I cannot remain silent”, in order to underscore the emotion and urgency behind her message. In Russian the phrase is “Ne mogu molchat” (I cannot stay silent) – and is a direct quote from Leo Tolstoy’s famous essay against capital punishment which he published in 1908, and which has since then been requoted and re-used countless times in pacifist and human rights contexts.
“Ukrainian military shoots on peaceful population in East Ukraine and the West remains silent. In the video, a school is shot at. And all this happens with the help of Europe and Germany. We should finally put an end to it! There is aggression by the Ukrainian government against the peaceful population of East Ukraine, they want to eradicate the people there. Do you still believe what is shown on the news, that Russia is attacking Ukraine? Look at the videos from Patrick Lancaster, they are in English, they show the situation as it is, and make up your own minds, and don’t believe everything that they put on tv or in the newspapers. I hope this aggression by the Ukrainian military against its own population in East Ukraine will stop soon! These bombardments have been going on for days, and this contradicts the Minsk Agreement! Is it democratic to kill your own population? Sorry, but I cannot remain silent” The rhetoric of this post uses the model of renaming described above: members of the Ukrainian military are represented as ‘terrorists’ in their own country. The post appeals specifically to civil courage and attempts to inspire empathy using the rhetoric of grass-roots protest (“we should finally put an end to it”). The war of aggression, which starts just a few days later, is thus indirectly legitimized through a pseudo-pacifist agenda (“I wish peace for Ukraine!”). The essay by Tolstoy functions here as a decoy, a signal that is supposed to represent an essentially belligerent agenda as a pacifist one.
“Ukrainian military shoots on peaceful population in East Ukraine and the West remains silent. In the video, a school is shot at. And all this happens with the help of Europe and Germany. We should finally put an end to it! There is aggression by the Ukrainian government against the peaceful population of East Ukraine, they want to eradicate the people there. Do you still believe what is shown on the news, that Russia is attacking Ukraine? Look at the videos from Patrick Lancaster, they are in English, they show the situation as it is, and make up your own minds, and don’t believe everything that they put on tv or in the newspapers. I hope this aggression by the Ukrainian military against its own population in East Ukraine will stop soon! These bombardments have been going on for days, and this contradicts the Minsk Agreement! Is it democratic to kill your own population? Sorry, but I cannot remain silent” The rhetoric of this post uses the model of renaming described above: members of the Ukrainian military are represented as ‘terrorists’ in their own country. The post appeals specifically to civil courage and attempts to inspire empathy using the rhetoric of grass-roots protest (“we should finally put an end to it”). The war of aggression, which starts just a few days later, is thus indirectly legitimized through a pseudo-pacifist agenda (“I wish peace for Ukraine!”). The essay by Tolstoy functions here as a decoy, a signal that is supposed to represent an essentially belligerent agenda as a pacifist one.
The Minsk Agreement can be read as a particularly key concept here, since it is used conspicuously often in the rhetoric of Russian propaganda. It is used to refer to a past ‘precedent’, according to which the Ukrainian side was the first to fail to comply with the peace agreement entered between Ukraine and Russia in 2015, although this was not actually the case.37 For example, the Minsk Agreement provided that the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk would remain a part of Ukraine and that local elections would be held there under Ukrainian law.
Contrary to these agreements, President Putin declared on 21 February 2022 that there was “no hope left” for the Minsk Peace Agreement, that is, no hope for a peaceful solution, and on the same day signed an acknowledgement of the self-proclaimed and internationally unrecognized People’s Republic of Luhansk (LNR) and People’s Republic of Donetsk (DNR) as independent states. The subsequent deployment of troops to separatist-controlled areas was presented as a response to the requests from the Peoples’ Republics of Donbas who had “asked Russia for support”38 (renaming again). With this, a war of aggression was effectively declared on the whole territory of Ukraine.
The quantity of false information that has been summarised in this paper demonstrates just how effective the principle of renaming, which Pocheptsov has described as the most important instrument in winning media crises, can be. It is not the Russian military intervention, which has caused a permanent state of war and destruction in the East of Ukraine since 2014, that is equated with terrorism, but the Ukrainian government. It is not the Russian side, which has failed to comply with the Minsk Agreement, that is being demonized here, but Ukraine. And yet the obviously false information quickly disappears from view, since the attention of the reader is constantly being directed towards the next topic that has to be put up for debate.
Such rhetoric provides an accurate reflection of the motivations of the Russian propagandists who are only interested in moving a transparent and solution-oriented political debate to an insecure arena of disinformation and media crises, where the search is only ever for ‘alternative’ opinions and where the truth can supposedly never be found.
Summary and conclusion
According to the model put forward by Pocheptsov, the special feature of the development of the Russian propaganda machine can be summarised as follows: it is a reversal of the usual speaker positions. While the state normally takes on the position of the ‘leader in parliament’, and the public press generally assumes the position of ‘leader of the street’, in order to level criticism and exert potential pressure on the government, here the government in Russia casts itself as a ‘leader’ of the masses and continually incites its own population to new battles: against the US, against the so-called Ukrainian ‘fascists’, but also against opposition groups or minorities that it describes as ‘extremist’.39
However, the apparently anti-hegemonial speaker position that Russian propagandist media in the West have adopted leads many critically readers and journalists astray, since they already mistrust politics and public media on the basis of their own convictions and are searching for an alternative.40 It is precisely this resignation that the Russian propaganda apparatus is exploiting to implement its own aggressive political agenda.
Since the variety of different speakers and actors behind Russian propaganda abroad cannot be determined exactly, the focus of philological research should not only be on correcting the false information that is being spread but also on analyzing the perspective, the point of view and tone of the statements made. Pocheptsov’s concept of the media crisis can be a helpful tool here.
English translation: Gwen Clayton
Info section
Authors
Footnotes
1.
2.
4.
9.
i.e. Snyder, Alvin A.: Warriers of disinformation: American propaganda, Soviet lies, and the winning of the Cold War. New York 1995, Taylor P.M.: Global Communications, international affairs and the media since 1945. London 1997, Champagne, Patrick: Faire l’opinion. Le nouveau jeu politique, Paris 1990.
10.
11.
13.
14.
15.
16.
21.
22.
23.
28.
29.
Sasse, Gwendolyn: „Kommentar: Zwischen Realität und Mythenbildung: Der Maidan vor fünf Jahren“ Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (30.11.2018) online source: https://www.bpb.de/themen/europa/ukraine-analysen/281640/kommentar-zwischen-realitaet-und-mythenbildung-der-maidan-vor-fuenf-jahren/ last accessed on 20.06.2024, Kuzio, Taras: Russia–Ukraine Crisis: The Blame Game, Geopolitics and National Identity, in: Europe-Asia Studies, 2018 (70.3), p. 467 or Shekhovtsov, Anton / Umland, Andreas: Analyse: Die ukrainische radikale Rechte, (see note 5).
31.
However, unfortunately this narrative, which still serves to legitimize the Russian war in Ukraine, was taken over by independent left-wing US media (e.g. Jacobin and Vice) and disseminated (Hume, Tim: How a Far-Right Battalion Became a Part of Ukraine’s National Guard, in: Vice 16.02.2022. online source: https://www.vice.com/en/article/3ab7dw/azov-battalion-ukraine-far-right?fbclid=IwAR0PWFTDmja8fDu13VovG_gxsK6AutiiBFTsVexwUs4TDDW-FKOVGczwoyA (last accessed on 23.07.23). / Marcetic, Branko: A US-Backed, Far Right–Led Revolution in Ukraine Helped Bring Us to the Brink of War, in: Jacobin 02.07.2022. online source: https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea?s=08, last accessed on 23.07.23.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Similarly, queer communities and the LGBTQ movement both count as ‘extremist’ in Russia. Cf. Meduza.io: “Itak, my uznali, pochemu LGBT-dviženie objavili v Rossii ėkstremistskim” [19.01.2024], online source: https://meduza.io/feature/2024/01/19/itak-my-uznali-pochemu-lgbt-dvizhenie-ob-yavili-v-rossii-ekstremistskim (last accessed on 20.05.24).