Ukrainian Literature and Culture in German-Speaking Countries

An Interview with Maria Ivanytska and Claudia Dathe
,
Very few people in Germany know about Ukrainian literature and culture. In this discussion, Maria Ivanytska, Professor at the Chair of Germanic Philology and Translation at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv, now MSCA4Ukraine fellow at the University of Tübingen, and Claudia Dathe, one of the leading translators of literature from Ukraine, explore the reasons for this.
What role do literature, translation, and cultural and literary studies play in the war, both in and outside of Ukraine?
Maria Ivanytska: Literature, translation, and cultural and literary studies play an important role in this war because they disseminate certain information and can therefore be instruments of information warfare or intercultural understanding, propaganda and / or manipulation. This applies, in particular, to literature about other countries, including fiction, publications in the humanities, and translations. These works, together with their para and metatexts, create a certain image of the foreign country in question.
When we talk about the Russian war of aggression against 
Ukraine
ukr. Ukrajina, deu. Ukraine

Ukraine is a country in Eastern Europe. Kiev is the capital and largest city of the country, which has been independent since 1991. Since 2022, the country has been defending itself against a comprehensive Russian invasion, which is directed in particular against the civilian population and the country's critical infrastructure and is part of a war against Ukraine that has been ongoing since 2014 and originated from the Russian Federation with the annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea in 2014.

, we start to see how certain cultural and especially literary activities have been preparing the ground for this war for years. Russia's propagandists constructed myths about Ukrainian nationalism and the infallibility of Russian politics, among other things. In doing so, they created this idea among their own population of a bipolar world. They also conveyed narratives of this kind to other countries through their information channels. According to these myths, 
Russia
deu. Russland, rus. Rossija, rus. Россия

The Russian Federation is the largest territorial state in the world and is inhabited by about 145 million people. The capital and largest city is Moscow, with about 11.5 million inhabitants, followed by St. Petersburg with more than 5.3 million inhabitants. The majority of the population lives in the European part of Russia, which is much more densely populated than the Asian part.

Since 1992, the Russian Federation has been the successor state to the Russian Soviet Republic (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, RSFSR), by far the largest constituent state of the former Soviet Union. It is also the legal successor of the Soviet Union in the sense of international law.

 alone saved the world from fascism and today stands as the sole defender of democracy, the Orthodox faith, and traditional family values. There is also countless evidence of how the Ukrainian idea of independence was portrayed as nationalistic in commentaries on translations of Ukrainian literature in the GDR era or in literary texts of the time.
The reception of Russian and Ukrainian literature in Germany has been shaped by ideology since the 19th century. I examine this by analyzing translations, including prefaces and epilogues, and I also look at reviews and academic texts on these literatures.
My analysis of over 100 volumes of translated and literary works1 has proven how dominant the ideological influence was in the transfer of literature. Here, too, the narratives that Russia uses today as arguments for war were already being spread. These include claims such as:
  • "Russians and Ukrainians are one people". This means that the right of the Ukrainian people to their own state is not recognized.2
  • "Russia is Ukraine's older brother", which can be seen as a denigration of Ukraine.3
  • "Ukrainians are nationalists", a characteristic that was and is attributed to those who advocate Ukrainian sovereignty.4
  • "The Ukrainian language is a dialect of Russian or a peasant language". The fight to denounce and suppress the Ukrainian language was already evident in language bans during the Tsarist era and the Russification policy during the Soviet era.5
     
    Translations and literary works thus disseminated certain information about Ukraine, its culture, and its literature. Ukrainian artists and cultural figures in exile attempted to create a differentiated image of Ukraine in Germany. However, until around 2003, their work was only received in narrow circles. Germany was rather Russia-centered. Only since the Suhrkamp publishing house added Ukrainian authors to its program has the perception of Ukrainian literature and Ukraine begun to change in Germany.

I believe that the presence of Ukrainian cultural representatives and artists in German-speaking countries – on a mental level – is extremely important, because it means Ukrainian voices can finally be heard here. We’re starting to be aware of Ukrainian interpretations of the war, which refute the Russian narratives that many Germans took at face value.

Claudia Dathe: Literature and translation play an important role in the war, both for Ukrainian society and for societies outside the war. In Ukrainian society, literature, especially poetry, but also other forms of artistic expression, are an important means of resistance right now, of visualizing community, and they’re also a real source of consolation in these violent and very insecure times. Meanwhile, literature (in translation) offers people outside of Ukraine the opportunity to face what is happening, and to perceive the news and analysis we hear in the media in a differentiated way, beyond the immediate aspects of war-torn Ukrainian society.
Why is it that, after the end of the Cold War, Western Europe's attention was focused almost exclusively on Russia, while the development of the other Eastern European states received little attention?6
Maria Ivanytska: This development can be explained primarily in political terms: On the one hand, the 
Soviet Union
deu. Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken, deu. Sowjetunion, rus. Sovetskiy Soyuz, rus. Советский Союз, . Совет Ушем, . Советонь Соткс, rus. Sovetskij Soûz, . Советий Союз, yid. ראַטן־פֿאַרבאַנד, yid. סאוועטן פארבאנד, yid. sovətn farband, yid. sovʿtn-farband, yid. sovətn-farband, . Советтер Союзу, . Совет Союзы, deu. Советий Союз, . Советон Цæдис, . Совет Эвилели

The Soviet Union (SU or USSR) was a state in Eastern Europe, Central and Northern Asia that existed from 1922 to 1991. It emerged from the so-called Soviet Russia, the successor state of the Russian Empire. The Russian Soviet Republic formed the core of the union and at the same time its largest part, with further constituent republics added. Their number varied over time and was related to the occupation of other countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Soviet republics that existed only for a short time (Karelo-Finlandia) or the division or merger of Soviet republics. In addition, there were numerous autonomous republics or other territorial units with an autonomy status that was essentially limited to linguistic autonomy for minorities.

Before its formal dissolution, the USSR consisted of 15 Soviet republics with a population of approximately 290 million people. At around 22.4 million km², it was the largest territorial state in the world at the time. The Soviet Union was a socialist soviet republic with a one-party system and an absence of separation of powers.

 was a huge state with powerful military and later also nuclear resources. A number of European countries were therefore afraid of dealing with the Soviet Union. But abroad, the Soviet Union was usually identified as Russia: All the decisions were made in Moscow, and the Russian language, which was spoken throughout the Soviet Union, marked the boundaries of the Russian cultural world. Russia played the role of the center and the other Soviet republics the role of Russia's colonies. You can read about this in the works of Ewa Thompson, Roman Szporluk, Ola Hnatiuk, and others.7 In this way, other countries' fear of the Soviet Union was actually a fear of Russia. Meanwhile, there was this narrative gradually developing in the Soviet Union that it was, above all, the Russian people who had suffered the most in the Second World War and that it was the Russian people alone who had defeated fascism. This can be seen, for example, in Stalin's speech in the Kremlin on May 24, 1945. I would like to quote a few words from this speech: "I propose a toast above all to the well-being of the Russian people, because theirs is the most outstanding nation among all the nations belonging to the Soviet Union. I propose a toast to the well-being of the Russian people, because in this war they have earned wide recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country. I raise a toast to the well-being of the Russian people, not only because they are the leading people, but also because they have a clear mind, a steadfast character, and patience."8    It also follows that responsibility for the Second World War, which became the focus of public discourse in Germany in the post-war period, was understood as a responsibility towards Russia. And when the first signs of a cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany emerged in the 1970s, the Federal Republic agreed to many of these narratives in the hope of gaining a close and collaborative partnership with Russia – as the leading power of the USSR – by establishing positive cultural and then economic ties.
 
I would like to refer to a case study to illustrate how this worked in Germany. It concerns an anthology of Ukrainian literature, which the exiled Ukrainian literary scholar and translator Anna-Halja Horbatsch was commissioned to translate in West Germany in 1970. The project was to be financed by the Institute for Foreign Relations (ifa) in Stuttgart. Inspired by the thawing of Cold War relations, this commission was the first expression of interest on the part of the German book market to introduce other republics of the USSR to the German reading public. Several publishers had previously rejected translations of Ukrainian literature. In her memoirs, Horbatsch writes about a condition imposed by the ifa that the anthology should under no circumstances emphasize the originality of Ukrainian literature. Any impression that the publication supported separatist efforts within the Soviet Union was to be avoided at all costs.9 Such wishes and fears on the part of both the ifa and the publishers make it clear how dependent literary relations were on Russian politics and how cautious Germany was in relation to the USSR. They also testify to the reluctance of German institutions to change their stereotype about Ukraine's affiliation with the Russian cultural sphere.
I would like to quote another statement made by Horbatsch in the 1970s concerning the book market in West Germany at that time:
 
   
Unfortunately, Horbatsch’s statement continued to apply in the following decades.

"Russophilia and a negative attitude towards everything non-Russian plays an important role among publishers who don’t believe that our literature or culture actually exist. [...] Today, we are seeing more positive examples of cultural contact, but this will not change anything as long as Moscow and Leningrad have a monopoly on the export of cultural values."10

Unfortunately, Horbatsch’s statement continued to apply in the following decades.
There is so much more interest in German literature among Ukrainians than vice versa? What has caused this asymmetry? On the Ukrainian side, there has been a lively interest in German literature and culture for decades, but on the German side, there has been barely any interest outside of Russian literature and culture? Do the countries’ different experiences of colonialism play a role here?
Maria Ivanytska: As I explained in my answer to the last question, Germany mostly oriented itself towards Russian literature and science. This can partly be explained by the fact that German intellectuals were familiar with the Russian imperial perspective because of Russia’s active self-portrayal and took this perspective for granted. Another reason for this stance was Germany's own imperial past. The theory of small literatures and nations11 is of relevance here; Russian and German literatures belong to the 'large' literatures, and Ukrainian literature to the 'small' ones. According to Kundera, a small nation perceives its own existence as an eternal struggle between existence and non-existence, whereas for a large nation, existence is a self-evident phenomenon. According to him, large nations also take on the active role of the subject, or think they are taking on this role, while small nations feel like "objects of history".12  This view and way of writing history prevailed and still prevails in both Germany and Russia. This is why the two countries maintained interstate and intercultural communication on an equal footing, even if it was not always about mutual understanding.

For post-war Germany, Ukraine was not an independent entity with which it was possible to speak as equals. This also explains why many Germans today want to lecture Ukraine and encourage it to enter into a dialog of reconciliation with Russian culture.

And my explanation for why a lot of German literature was and is translated in Ukraine is the fact that Ukraine felt and still feels part of the European cultural sphere. This feeling of belonging to Central Europe aroused interest in European literature and the transfer of this literature into Ukraine. Many Ukrainian writers and poets, who also often worked as translators, had an excellent command of German and translated hundreds of German-language authors into Ukrainian.
How can interest in Ukrainian culture be kept stable regardless of the war and also after it?
Claudia Dathe: Many people remain attached to this national thinking in their concepts, ideas, and projects – as this question about the “interest in Ukrainian culture” also shows. The only way we can ensure that Ukrainian artists, creatives, and cultural representatives are involved in a stable and sustainable way is by moving beyond the paradigm of the national. In the future, it will be important to integrate actors from Ukraine, including their perspectives and experiences, into European discussion spaces and debates. At the same time, we need to move away from this national paradigm of “we in Germany” versus “you in Ukraine”, which is also an unconscious perpetuation of the paradigm of exclusion.

This article is part of a series of articles based on the conference German Narratives on Russia's War in Ukraine. The conference took place as part of the Volkswagen Foundation's War in Ukraine theme week from February 22 to 24, 2023 at Herrenhausen Palace in Hanover. The organizers: Dr. Cornelia Ilbrig (Lower Saxony Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Göttingen), Dr. Jana-Katharina Mende (Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg) and Prof. Dr. Monika Wolting (University of Wrocław). Both the conference and the translation of this article were made possible by the Volkswagen Foundation.
The questions are taken from a round table discussion held on 23 February 2023 on the role of Ukrainian culture and literature in times of war.
The questions were asked by Cornelia Ilbrig.
English translation: William Connor
Logo
Logo
Logo
Logo

Info section